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(57) ABSTRACT 
Systems and methods of securely communicating from a 
sender device to a receiver device on a communication chan-
nel are disclosed. One disclosed method is for securely com-
municating from a sender device to a receiver device on a 
main channel when an eavesdropper device is listening on an 
eavesdropper channel. The main channel has an signal-to-
noise ratio SNRM, and the eavesdropper channel has a signal-
to-noise ratio SNRr The method comprises encoding a mes-
sage at a physical layer with a secure error correcting code 
(SECC) to produce an encoded message, and transmitting the 
encoded message on the main channel. The SECC has a set of 
defined characteristics such that when the eavesdropper 
device is more than a predetermined distance Z from the 
sender, at least a predefined fraction of the message is unre-
liable, where the predefined fraction of unreliable bits renders 
the eavesdropper unable to reliable decode messages on the 
main channel. 
23 Claims, 16 Drawing Sheets 
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SYSTEMS AND METHODS OF SECURE 
CODING FOR PHYSICAL LAYER 
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional 
Application No. 60/893,998, filed Mar. 9, 2007, which is 
hereby incorporated by reference. 
FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE 
2 
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a timeline for generating 
and using multiple keys over time applicable to one embodi-
ment of the logic for providing opportunistic security for 
physical communication channels from FIG. 1. 
FIG. 8 is a block diagram of one embodiment of a sender 
device and a receiver device utilizing secure error correcting 
codes at the physical layer. 
FIG. 9 is a diagram of one embodiment of the devices from 
FIG. 8. 
10 FIG. 10 is a graph illustrating bit error probability perfor-
mance of a secure error correcting code used by an example 
embodiment of the secure error correct code (SECC) logic 
from FIG. 8 
The present disclosure relates to data communication, and FIG. 11 is a block diagram illustrating selected compo-
more specifically, to secure coding for physical layer com- 15 nents of one embodiment of the physical layer component 
munication channels. from FIG. 8. 
BACKGROUND 
FIG. 12 illustrates an exemplary hardware block diagram 
of a computer system which can be used in connection with 
exemplary embodiments. 
The conventional method of providing secure communica- 20 
tion over a channel uses cryptography. Cryptography relies SUMMARY 
on the existence of codes that are "hard to break": that is, 
one-way functions that are believed to be computationally 
infeasible to invert. Therefore, cryptography is vulnerable to 
an increase in computing power or the development of more 25 
efficient attacks. Furthermore, the assumptions about the 
hardness of certain one-way functions have not been proven 
mathematically, so cryptography is vulnerable if these 
assumptions are incorrect. 
Systems and methods of providing opportunistic security 
for physical communication channels are disclosed. One dis-
closed method is for securely communicating from a sender 
device to a receiver device on a main channel when an eaves-
dropper device is listening on an eavesdropper channel. The 
main channel has an signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, and the 
eavesdropper channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRE" The 
30 method comprises encoding a message at a physical layer 
with a secure error correcting code (SECC) to produce an 
encoded message, and transmitting the encoded message on 
the main channel. The SECC has a set of defined character-
Another weakness of cryptography is the lack of no precise 
metrics or absolute comparisons between various crypto-
graphic algorithms, showing the trade off between reliability 
and security as a function of the block length of plaintext and 
ciphertext messages. Instead, a particular cryptographic algo-
rithm is considered "secure" if it survives a defined set of 35 
istics such that when the eavesdropper device is more than a 
predetermined distance Z from the sender, at least a pre-
defined fraction of the message is unreliable. The predefined attacks, or "insecure" if it does not. 
Cryptography as applied to some media (e.g., wireless 
networks) also requires a trusted third party as well as com-
plex protocols and system architectures. Therefore, a need 
exists for these and other problems to be addressed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Many aspects of the disclosure can be better understood 
with reference to the following drawings. The components in 
the drawings are not necessarily to scale, emphasis instead 
being placed upon clearly illustrating the principles of the 
present disclosure. 
fraction of unreliable bits renders the eavesdropper unable to 
reliably decode messages on the main channel. 
One disclosed system is for securely communicating from 
40 a sender device to a receiver device on a main channel when 
an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper chan-
nel. The main channel has an signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, and 
the eavesdropper channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRE. 
The system comprises an encoder and a transmitter. The 
45 encoder is configured to encode a plurality ofbits at a physical 
layer with a secure error correcting code (SECC) to produce 
a plurality of encoded bits. The transmitter is configured to 
transmit the encoded plurality of bits on the main channel. 
The SECC has a set of defined characteristics such that when FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an environment in which one 
embodiment of a system and method for providing opportu- 50 
nistic security for physical communication channels is 
located. 
the eavesdropper device is more than a predetermined dis-
tance Z from the sender, a bit error probability on the eaves-
dropper channel does not exceed a predetermined security 
threshold while a bit error probability on the main channel 
does exceed a predetermined reliability threshold. The plu-
FIG. 2. is a block diagram of the channel between the 
sender device and the receiver device from FIG. 1, at the 
physical layer. 
FIG. 3 is a graph of signal quality, over time, on the main 
channel and the eavesdropper channel from FIG. 1. 
FIG. 4 is a sequence diagram of one embodiment of the 
logic for providing opportunistic security for physical com-
munication channels from FIG. 1. 
FIGS. SA-E are block diagrams illustrating an example 
scenario with the sender, the receiver, and the eavesdropper 
from FIG. 1. 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the multilevel coder and 
encoder used by some embodiments of the logic for providing 
opportunistic security for physical communication channels 
from FIG. 1. 
55 rality of encoded bits includes a fraction of unreliable bits 
which render the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode mes-
sages on the main channel. 
Also disclosed is a radio frequency identification (RFID) 
tag for securely communicating from the RFID tag to an 
60 RFID reader on a main channel when an eavesdropper device 
is listening on an eavesdropper channel. The main channel 
has an signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, and the eavesdropper 
channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRE" The system com-
prises an encoder and a transmitter. The encoder is configured 
65 to encode a plurality of bits at a physical layer with a secure 
error correcting code (SECC) to produce a plurality of 
encoded bits. The transmitter is configured to transmit the 
US 8,781,125 B2 
3 
encoded plurality of bits on the main channel. The SECC has 
a set of defined characteristics such that when the eavesdrop-
per device is more than a predetermined distance Z from the 
sender, at least a predefined fraction of the message is unre-
liable. The predefined fraction of unreliable bits renders the 
eavesdropper unable to reliably decode messages on the main 
channel. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
4 
At the physical layer, both channels can be modeled as 
including noise inputs which affect signal quality: main chan-
nel 210 is affected by noise input 240 and eavesdropper 
channel 230 is affected by noise input 250. One or both of 
devices 110 has information about the signal quality on 
eavesdropper channel 230, and in embodiments where only 
one device 110 has this signal quality information, the infor-
mation can be communicated to the other device. The tech-
Symmetric encryption uses a key to transform a message 
into a form that is unreadable to anyone that does not have the 
key. Since the key itselfis a shared secret, this form of encryp-
tion relies on a method of providing the sender's key to the 
receiver in a secure manner. The systems and methods dis- 15 
closed herein exploit naturally-occurring properties of the 
communication channel itself, at the physical layer, which 
allow the sender and the receiver to generate the same key, 
rather than having the sender transmit the key to the receiver, 
niques disclosed herein also allow for the possibility that 
10 
eavesdropper 220 has information about the signal quality on 
main channel 210, but the techniques insure that such infor-
mation is not sufficient to allow eavesdropper 220 to obtain 
key 180. 
Both devices 110 include physical layer opportunistic 
security logic 260. Logic 260 in llOS cooperates with logic 
260 in device 11 OR to provide security at the physical layer in 
an opportunistic manner, by exploiting characteristics of 
noisy channels 210, 230 in combination with information 
as occurs in conventional cryptographic solutions. In some 
embodiments, the distilled key is used by a higher protocol 
layer to encrypt messages, using, for example, standard secret 
key encryption algorithms. In other embodiments, the key 
distilled at both sides is used as a one-time pad to provide 
perfect secrecy. 
20 about relative signal quality of channels 210 and 230. These 
techniques for exploiting channel characteristics will be 
described in further detail after relative signal quality is dis-
cussed connection with FIG. 3, 
FIG. 3 is a graph of signal quality on main channel 210 and 
25 eavesdropper channel 230, over time. As can be seen in FIG. 
3, there are time periods 310 during which signal quality 320 
on main channel 210 is better than signal quality 330 on 
eavesdropper channel 230. In this disclosure, these time peri-
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an environment in which one 
embodiment of a system and method for providing opportu-
nistic security for physical communication channels is 
located. A system 100 includes two devices, llOS and llOR, 
each of which includes a physical layer component 120 and a 30 
higher layer component 130. At the physical layer, sender 
device llOS uses two different time periods to transmit two 
different kinds of information to receiver device llOR: ran-
dom symbols 140 are transmitted during some time periods 
150; and coding information 160 is transmitted during other 
time periods 170. Both sender llOS and receiver llOR then 
use an algorithm to combine coding information 160 with 
random symbols 140 to distill a key 180. 
ods 310 will be referred to as "reliable" or "secret" time 
periods. There are also periods of time 340 during which the 
converse is true, and message channel signal quality 320 is 
worse than wiretap channel signal quality 330. These time 
periods 340 will be referred to as "unreliable" or "non-secret" 
Once discovered by each side, key 180 is then communi-
cated from physical layer component 120 in each device 110 
to the corresponding higher layer component 130 in the same 
device 110. After using key 180 to encrypt a message, higher 
layer component 130 in sender device llOS transmits the 
encrypted message 190 to receiver device 11 OR. Higher layer 
component 130 in receiver device llOR uses key 180 to 
decrypt message 190. 
35 time periods. Although this behavior is typical of wireless 
channels (where fading causes random fluctuations of the 
signal's amplitude and phase), a person ofordinary skill in the 
art would recognize that the principles described herein apply 
to any physical medium which experiences random noise or 
40 random fluctuations in signal strength, and thus these two 
different time periods. 
Physical layer opportunistic security logic 260 exploits 
these varying differences in relative signal quality by com-
municating two different types of information from sender 
45 device llOS to receiver device llOR in these two different 
A few examples of higher protocol layer 130 are wired 
equivalent privacy (WEP) at the media access control (MAC) 
layer, internet protocol security (IPSec) at the network layer, 
and secure sockets layer (SSL) at the application layer. How- 50 
ever, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand 
that the key discovery techniques disclosed herein can be 
used by any protocol layer 130 above the physical layer. Such 
a person will also understand that although FIG. 1, and other 
figures herein, illustrate example scenarios in which device 55 
11 OS acts as a sender and device 11 OR acts as a receiver, each 
device is capable of acting as both a transmitter and a receiver. 
The physical layer of the channel between sender device 
11 OS and receiver device 11 OR will now be described in more 
detail in connection with the block diagram ofFIG. 2. System 60 
200 includes devices 110, which are in communication over a 
main channel 210. System 200 also includes a third device 
220, which is capable of listening to (eavesdropping on) 
transmissions on main channel 210, using an eavesdropper 
channel 230. Eavesdropper 220 is passive with respect to 65 
main channel 21 O; eavesdropper 220 does not jam main chan-
nel 210, insert bits on main channel 210, etc. 
time periods. During periods 310 in which message channel 
signal quality 3 20 is better than wiretap channel signal quality 
330-i.e., during secret periods-random symbols 140 are 
sent over main channel 210. In the example embodiments 
described herein, logic 260 in sender device llOS transmits 
these random symbols 140. In other embodiments, a fourth 
party (e.g., a broadcast satellite) transmits random symbols 
140. 
During periods 340 in which message channel signal qual-
ity 320 is worse than wiretap channel signal quality 330-i.e., 
during non-secret periods-coding information 160 is sent 
over main channel 210. Thus, there is a correspondence 
between the time periods in FIG. 3 and the time periods in 
FIG. 1: the secret periods 310 in FIG. 3 correspond to trans-
mit-random-symbols periods 160 in FIG. 1, and the non-
secret periods 340 correspond to transmit-coding-informa-
tion periods 170. 
During good-quality-on-message-channel periods 310, 
receiver device llOR accumulates random symbols 140 but 
does not use the bits represented by the symbols. After coding 
information 160 has been communicated during bad-quality-
on-message-channel periods 340, sender llOS and receiver 
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HOR combine this additional coding information 160 with 
the accumulated random symbols 140 to produce key 180 
(see FIG. 1). 
According to the principles of information-theoretic secu-
rity, eavesdropper 220 cannot determine key 180 under these 
conditions. Information-theoretic security principles show 
that system 200 has positive secrecy capacity during good-
quality-on-message-channel periods, or reliable periods, 310. 
As will be described in further detail below, sender device 
HOS and receiver device HOR share common randomness 10 
through the random symbols 140 transmitted by sender 
device HOS during reliable periods 310. This transmission 
results in a set of symbols which is correlated between sender 
and receiver. Information-theoretic security principles also 15 
show that system 200 has zero secrecy capacity during bad-
quality-on-message-channel periods, or unreliable periods, 
340. Coding information 160 is transmitted during unreliable 
periods 340, and receiver device HOR uses this coding infor-
mation 160 to recover the bits represented by already-trans- 20 
mitted random symbols 140. The code is designed to match 
the secrecy capacity of a particular system: the strength of the 
code guarantees that legitimate receiver device HOR can 
recover a sequence of bits identical to those of the transmitter. 
6 
mized so that information is transmitted at a rate close to 
channel capacity, while still satisfying the power constraint of 
main channel 210. 
Both sender HOS and receiver HOR map (420) the 
received symbols (X and Y respectively) to a bit sequence. 
However, since some amount of noise may be present on main 
channel 210, the bit sequence Q(Y) produced by receiver 
HOR may differ from the bit sequence Q(X) produced by 
sender HOS. That is, bit sequence Q(Y) may contain errors. 
When logic 260 detects that message channel signal qual-
ity 320 is worse than wiretap charmel signal quality 330 (i.e., 
during unreliable periods 340), sender HOS generates (430) 
error-correcting (coding) information 160 from the bit 
sequence Q(X), and transmits (440) coding information 160 
over main channel 210. During these unreliable periods 340, 
receiver HOR decodes (4SO) coding information 160 and 
uses this information to recover or reconcile the original bit 
sequence Q(X). In some embodiments, coding information 
160 takes the form of a low-density parity-check code 
(LDPC). In other embodiments, coding information 160 
takes the form of a turbo code. 
After reconciliation, sender HOS communicates (460) a 
random function over main charmel 210, and each side 
applies ( 470) that random function to reconciled bit sequence 
Q(X). This application is also known as privacy amplifica-
tion, and the result is secure key 180. In some embodiments, 
this random function is a universal hash function, with the 
property of producing an output sequence that is in general 
much smaller than the input sequence. 
Notably, the reconciliation and privacy amplification steps, 
using coding information 160 already transmitted during a 
reliable period 310, may be conducted over several disjoint 
unreliable periods 340. Furthermore, in some embodiments 
coding information 160 is transmitted in some reliable peri-
Since system 200 has (by definition) zero secrecy capacity 25 
during unreliable periods 340, it is possible for eavesdropper 
220 to obtain some of the information that is transmitted 
during these unreliable periods 340. In fact, information theo-
retic security principles can quantify the maximum amount of 
information learned by eavesdropper 220, regardless of par- 30 
ticular decoding methods which eavesdropper 220 might use. 
However, an additional step (privacy amplification) taken by 
sender HOS and receiver HOR after the reconstruction guar-
antees that eavesdropper 220 can obtain no information from 
the amplified reconstructed bit sequence. Since the amplified 
and reconstructed bit sequence can be used as a key 180 by 
both sides, it follows that the techniques disclosed herein 
allow key 180 to be generated by both sides in a manner that 
precludes eavesdropper 220 from obtaining key 180, and thus 
the techniques provide secure communication. 
35 ods 310 as well as unreliable periods 340, to ensure some 
minimum amount of time is available for processing random 
symbols are processed. 
FIGS. SA-E are block diagrams illustrating an example 
scenario with sender HOS, receiver HOR, and eavesdropper 
40 220. Sender HOS and receiver HOR communicate over main 
FIG. 4 is a sequence diagram of one embodiment of physi-
cal layer opportunistic security logic 260. Sequence 400 starts 
when logic 260 detects that message channel signal quality 
320 is better than wiretap channel signal quality 330 (i.e., 45 
during a reliable period 310). A person ofordinary skill in the 
art would be familiar with detection using standard channel 
estimation techniques, such as pilot-assisted symbol estima-
tion, etc. During reliable periods 310, sender HOS transmits 
(410) over main channel 210 a series of symbols (X) selected 50 
at random from a symbol set. In some embodiments, the 
symbols are quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) sym-
bols. 
After the random symbol transmission 410, sender HOS 
and receiver HOR share a set of correlated continuous-valued 55 
symbols. Since continuous values are used, extracting a 
sequence of common bits from these continuous sequences is 
not straightforward, and standard coding techniques cannot 
be applied directly. Therefore, the systems and methods dis-
closed herein use multilevel coding. Multilevel coding quan- 60 
tizes the continuous symbols and then assigns a binary label 
channel 210, which is subject to noise input 240. Eavesdrop-
per 220 listens on eavesdropper channel 230, which is subject 
to noise input 2SO. 
FIG. SA illustrates the behavior of the parties during reli-
able periods 310. As described earlier, sender HOS transmits 
over main channel 210 a sequence of random symbols 140. In 
this diagram, the symbol waveforms as seen by sender HOS, 
receiver HOR, and eavesdropper 220 are shown as X, Y, and 
Z, respectively, while the sequence of quantized bits detected 
by the three parties are shown as Q(X), Q(Y) and Q(Z), 
respectively. In this example, the originally transmitted bit 
sequence Q(X) is 10110. Since main channel 210 is subject to 
noise, the sequence Q(Y) seen by receiver HOR is slightly 
different: 10101. Since transmission of random symbols 
occurs during reliable periods 310, in which message channel 
signal quality 3 20 is better than wiretap channel signal quality 
330, the sequence Q(Z) seen by eavesdropper 220 will, on 
average, contain more errors. Here, Q(Z) is 11011, which 
contains three bit errors as compared to two bit errors in Q(Y). 
FIG. SB illustrates the behavior of the parties during unre-
liable periods 340. As described earlier, sender HOS trans-
mits coding information 160 which allows receiver HOR to 
reconstruct the original bit sequence Q(X) from the 
received-and possibly errored-bit sequence Q(Y), while 
to each of the quantized values. Although basic principles of 
multilevel coding have been proposed for use in general com-
munication, here the use of multilevel codes is extended to the 
reconciliation of correlated sequences. In some embodi-
ments, the number of symbols, the amplitudes of the symbols, 
and the probability distribution of the symbols are all opti-
65 also preventing eavesdropper 220 from reconstructing the 
original sequence. In this example, the error correcting code 
is a single parity bit protecting a group of three bits, so the 
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transmitted code Cl (SlO) indicates even parity. The first 
three bits in Q(Y) were received by receiver HOR with even 
parity, so no error is detected by receiver HOR and the first 
three bits in Q(Y) remain as is. Eavesdropper 220 also 
receives code Cl, but the bits in Q(Z) contain more errors, 
since wiretap channel signal quality 330 was worse when 
Q(Z) was received. Thus, the first three bits in Q(Z) still 
contain errors, even after code Cl is received. 
The reconciliation phase continues as illustrated in FIG. 
SC. The transmitted code C2 (S20) also indicates even parity. 
Here, the second group of three bits in Q(Y) were received 
with odd parity, so an error is detected and the second group 
of three bits in Q(Y) are corrected to 010. The reconciliation 
phase is completed in FIG. SD, where transmitted code C3 
(S30) indicates even parity, and the last three bits in Q(Y) 
remain unchanged. As before, Q(Z) as seen by eavesdropper 
220 still contains errors, even after all three codes Cl, C2 and 
C3 are received. 
The final phase for key generatio is illustrated in FIG. SE. 
At the end of the reconciliation function, the bit sequence 
Q(Z) is still correlated with sequence Q(X), which means 
eavesdropper 220 can guess some information about original 
bit sequence Q(X). To amplify the amount of privacy, sender 
HOS broadcasts a random function, which is received by 
receiver HOR and eavesdropper 220. Each party applies the 
random function to Q(X), Q(Y), and Q(Z), respectively. 
Application of the random function by sender HOS and 
receiver HOR produces the same key 180, while eavesdrop-
per 220 produces a different key S40. Information-theoretic 
security principles guarantee that each bit of the eavesdrop-
per-generated key S60 has a particular degree of indepen-
dence from corresponding bits of key 180. That is, the error 
correcting code and the privacy amplification function are 
designed to guarantee that key S40 is as independent of key 
180 as is desired, which means that eavesdropper 220 can 
extract no information about key 180. 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the multilevel coder and 
encoder used by some embodiments of physical layer oppor-
tunistic security logic 260. As described earlier, noise input 
240 introduces discrepancies between the received data as 
seen by receiver HOR and the random symbols sent by sender 
HOS. Sender HOS generates reconciliation, or coding, infor-
mation 160 to correct these discrepancies. Logic 260 within 
sender device HOS includes a bit labeler 610 which receives 
transmitted symbols X and assigns an m-bit binary label to 
each symbol X. A multilevel coder 620 (e.g., a LDPC coder) 
successively computes a series of m syndromes s. Syndromes 
s are transmitted on main channel 210 during reliable periods 
310. 
Logic 260 within receiver device HOR recovers syn-
dromes s. Random symbols Y (previously received during 
unreliable periods 340) are processed by a demapper 630 to 
produce a bit sequence which, in combination with syn-
dromes s, is decoded by a multistage decoder 6SO. Thus, 
decoder 6SO uses syndromes s as side information. 
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eavesdropper 220 guesses one instance of the key, that key 
instance is in use for only a short period of time. 
In some embodiments, the frequency of key generatio is 
based on characteristics of main channel 210, eavesdropper 
channel 230, or both (e.g., the ratio ofreliable periods 310 to 
unreliable periods 340, the ratio of average main channel 
signal quality to average eavesdropper channel signal quality, 
or the absolute signal quality of either channel). In some 
embodiments, physical layer component 120 (see FIG. 1) 
10 generates the key in response to a request by higher-layer 
component 130. In other embodiments, physical layer com-
ponent 120 generates the key of its own accord, without a 
request by higher-layer component 130. 
In the embodiments discussed above, a key was generated 
15 at both the sender and receiver by combining information 
transmitted during a positive-secrecy time period (transmis-
sion of random symbols) with information transmitted during 
a zero-secrecy time period (coding information used to rec-
oncile the correlated symbols). Other embodiments will now 
20 be described which take advantage of environments in which 
the main message channel (between "friendly" transmitter 
and "friendly" receiver) always has positive secrecy capacity. 
Positive secrecy capacity is assured when the eavesdropper 
is more than a certain distance away from the friendly (mes-
25 sage) transmitter, thus guaranteeing that the signal quality on 
the message channel is better than the signal quality on the 
eavesdropper channel. In such environments, all transmission 
periods are considered to be good-quality-on-message-chan-
nel periods 310. The embodiments described below in con-
30 nection with FIGS. 8-H utilize secure error correcting codes 
(SECCs) at the physical layer to insure communication 
between the friendly parties that is both reliable and secure. 
In the real world, this assumption is perhaps most reason-
able when the distance between friendly transmitter and the 
35 friendly receiver is on the order of a few meters. One non-
limiting example of such a scenario is an radio frequency 
identification (RFID) tag transmitting to a RFID reader. In 
such cases, an eavesdropper that is on the order of tens of 
meters away from the friendly transmitter has an signal qual-
40 ity that is hundreds of times worse than that of the main 
message channel (since the signal power is proportional to the 
square of the distance). However, the techniques described 
herein are applicable any time the message channel has posi-
tive secrecy capacity. The laws of physics gurantees that the 
45 signal quality will be lower forthe eavesdropper as long as the 
eavesdropper is physically further away from the friendly 
transmitter than the friendly receiver is. The relative antenna 
sizes of the friendly parties and the eavesdropper determine 
the specific distance between the eavesdropper and the 
50 friendly transmitter that is required for positive secrecy 
capacity to be obtained. In other words, the techniques 
described below can guarantee a perfect secrecy zone of size 
Z around the friendly transmitter, given a specific set of 
antenna sizes. 
55 
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a timeline 700 for generat-
ing and using multiple keys over time. A time period 710 in 
which a first key is generated is followed by another time 
period 720 in which the first key is used for encryption. A 
second key is generated in time period 730, and this second 60 
key is used during time period 740. Similarly, a third key is 
generatedin time period 7SO, and this third key is used during 
time period 760. As explained earlier, each of key generatio 
periods 710, 730, 7SO is itself composed of reliable sub-
periods during which random symbols are distributed and 65 
unreliable sub-periods during which reconciliation occurs. In 
this manner, key 180 is periodically refreshed, so that even if 
FIG. 8 is a block diagram of a sender device and a receiver 
device utilizing secure error correcting codes at the physical 
layer. System 800 includes devices 81 OS and 81 OR which are 
in communication over a main channel 820. Main channel 
820 is subject to a noise input 830. System 800 also includes 
another device 840 which is capable of listening to (eaves-
dropping on) transmissions on main channel 820, over an 
eavesdropperchannel8SO.Eavesdropperchannel8SOissub-
ject to a noise input 860. Eavesdropper 840 is passive with 
respect to main channel 820; eavesdropper 840 does not jam 
main channel 820, insert bits on main channel 820, etc. In the 
embodiments discussed below in connection with FIGS. 
8-H, channels 820 and 8SO are wireless.Anon-limiting list of 
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examples of wireless technologies includes: radio frequency 
identification (RFID) networks (e.g., ISO 14443, ISO 18000-
6); wireless local area networks (e.g. IEEE 802.11, com-
monly known as WiFi); wireless wide area networks (e.g., 
WiMAX or IEEE 802.16); wireless personal area networks 5 
(e.g., Bluetooth, IEEE 802.15.4, commonly known as Zig-
Bee) and wireless telephone networks (e.g., CDMA, GSM, 
GPRS, EDGE). Although the embodiments discussed below 
in connection with FIGS. 8-11 involve wireless channels 820 
and 880, the principles disclosed herein apply also apply to 10 
wired channels. 
Each device 810 includes a physical layer component 870, 
where the physical layer 870 incorporates secure error cor-
recting coding (SECC) logic 880. Although device 810S is 
described as operating a sender and device 810R as a receiver, 15 
a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that each 
device 810 is capable of acting as both a transmitter and a 
receiver. 
FIG. 9 is a diagram of devices 810S and 810R utilizing 
secure error correcting codes at the physical layer. FIG. 9 20 
illustrates a feature which is exploited by some embodiments 
when devices 810 are in close proximity to each other relative 
to the distance from eavesdropper 840. When the distance 910 
from sender 810S to receiver 810R is much smaller than the 
distance 920 from sender 810S to eavesdropper 840, the 25 
signal-to-noise ratio on main charmel 820 (SNRM) is better 
than the signal-to-noise ratio on eavesdropper channel 850 
(SNRE), as can be shown using basic communications theory. 
The secure error-correcting coding techniques disclosed 
herein exploit this property to insure that information on main 30 
channel 820 remains secret from eavesdropper 840 while also 
providing high reliability on main channel 820. The secure 
error correcting code (SECC) used by logic 880 provides a 
perfect secrecy zone 930 within a given distance Z from 
sender 810S. In the example embodiment shown in FIG. 9, 35 
perfect secrecy zone 930 is a circle, so that Z is the radius of 
that circle. Outside perfect secrecy zone 930, the signal-to-
noise ratio on eavesdropper charmel 850 (SNRE) results in a 
bit error rate on eavesdropper charmel 850 (BERE) that is high 
enough to guarantee that a specific percentage of the bits 40 
obtained from transmissions by sender 810S are unreliable. 
Logic 880 uses an SECC which guarantees that this unreli-
able information renders eavesdropper 840 unable to reliably 
decode messages sent on main charmel 820. A suitably 
designed SECC ensures that the bit error rate experienced by 45 
the eavesdropper is higher than the bit error rate produced by 
10 
sharp waterfall region (sharp dropoff between 1010 and 
1020) as well as high BER at low SNRs. In some embodi-
ments, the SECC used by logic 880 is based on a linear block 
code. In other embodiments, the SECC is a turbo code. In still 
other embodiments, the SECC is a low density parity check 
code. 
Various embodiments of SECC logic 880 achieve a larger 
or smaller perfect secrecy zone 1030 by using an SECC with 
a slightly different SNR vs. BER curve. For example, a larger 
perfect secrecy zone 1030 is achieved by using a code which 
has a lower BER at a high SNR as compared to FIG. 10. In 
other words, the predetermined reliability threshold 1010 
moves to the right. Codes that provide a larger secrecy zone 
may be relatively complex. A smaller perfect secrecy zone 
1030 is achieved by using a code in which the predetermined 
reliability threshold 1010 moves to the left as compared to 
FIG. 10. 
Some embodiments of devices 810S and 810R include 
encryption at higher layers of the protocol stack in addition to 
the security provided by SECC logic 880 at the physical layer. 
A few examples of encryption at a higher layer are wired 
equivalent privacy (WEP) at the media access control (MAC) 
layer, internet protocol security (IPSec) at the network layer, 
and secure sockets layer (SSL) at the application layer. How-
ever, the SECC techniques disclosed herein can be used in 
combination with any protocol layer above the physical layer. 
When using this combination principles of information-theo-
retic security show that as long as the eavesdropper is more 
than a certain distance away from the friendly transmitter and 
receiver, the eavesdropper will necessarily have a number of 
errors after decoding and that this number of errors, when 
combined with a particular cryptographic code, will render 
the eavesdropper virtually unable to decode the message. 
Furthermore, the SECC techniques described herein allow 
flexibility in the level of security that is required against an 
eavesdropper. For example, if it is known that the eavesdrop-
per is more than a certain distance away, then the SECC can 
be less complex. 
FIG. 11 is a block diagram illustrating selected compo-
nents of one embodiment of a physical layer 870. Sender 
physical layer 870S includes a framer 1110, an encoder 1120, 
and a modulator 1130. Framer 1110 operates on a message 
from a higher protocol layer. The message comprises a stream 
of bits 1135, and produces a block 1145, which may include 
header and trailer information. Block 1145 is encoded by 
SECC encoding logic 1140 within encoder 1120, producing 
one or more encoded bits 1155. Encoded bits 1155 are modu-
lated by modulator 1130 and transmitted over main channel 
a conventional error correcting code. In fact Shannon's infor-
mation theory can be used to show the existence, in certain 
situations, of SECCs that make the reliability of the eaves-
dropper's information as low as possible. 50 820 to receiver physical layer 870R. Receiver physical layer 
870R inculdes a demodulator 1150, a decoder 1160, and a 
framer 1170. Symbols received on main channel 820 are 
mapped to bits 1175 by demodulator 115, and bits 1175 are 
To do so, logic 880 uses a secure error correcting code 
(SECC) with specific properties or characteristics. These 
properties or characteristics are related to SNRM and SNRD 
where SNRM and SNRE are tum related to the distance 
between sender 810S and receiver 810R, and the distance 55 
from sender 81 OS to eavesdropper 840 (respectively). FIG. 10 
is a graph 1000 illustrating bit error probability performance 
of a secure error correcting code used by an example embodi-
ment oflogic 880. As can be seen in the plot ofSNR vs. BER 
behavior in graph 1000, for a given expected SNR on main 60 
channel 820 (SNRM), the SECC used by logic 880 produces 
a bit error rate (on main channel 820) which exceeds a pre-
determined reliability threshold 1010. For a given expected 
SNR on eavesdropper channel 850, the same SECC produces 
a bit error rate (on eavesdropper channel 850) which is less 65 
than a predetermined security threshold 1020. The SECC 
used by logic 880 could thus be described as exhibiting a 
decoded by SECC decoding logic 1180 within decoder 1160. 
The group of decoded bits 1185 are received by framer 1190, 
which strips off header/trailer bits as necessary to reveal the 
orginally transmitted message. The message may then be 
passed up to a higher protocol layer. 
In some embodiments, one side of the communication 
channel has less processing or computing capabilities than 
the other. In some embodiments, the properties of the com-
munication channel may be asymmetrical (e.g., 10 Mbit/sec 
in one direction and 1 Mbit/sec in the other). In such embodi-
ments, one side may use different modulation and/or framing 
techniques when transmitting than the other side does. As a 
non-limiting example, one side may transmit using quadra-
ture amplitude modulation with 16 different symbols 
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(QAMl 6) while the other side may transmit using quadrature 
amplitude modulation with 64 different symbols (QAM64). 
FIG. 12 is a hardware block diagram of a computer system 
1200 which can be used to implement device 110 in accor-
dance with various embodiments of the systems and methods 
12 
order from that shown or discussed, including substantially 
concurrently or in reverse order, depending on the function-
ality involved. 
The foregoing description has been presented for purposes 
of illustratio and description. It is not intended to be exhaus-
tive or to limit the disclosure to the precise forms disclosed. 
Obvious modifications or variations are possible in light of 
the above teachings. The implementations discussed, how-
ever, were chosen and described to illustrate the principles of 
10 the disclosure and its practical application to thereby enable 
one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the disclosure in 
various implementations and with various modifications as 
are suited to the particular use contemplated. All such modi-
fications and variation are within the scope of the disclosure 
of providing opportunistic security for physical communica-
tion channels, or to implement device 810 in accordance with 
various embodiments of the systems and methods of utilizing 
secure error correcting codes at the physical layer. Computer 
system 1200 contains a number of components that are well 
known in the art of data communications, including a proces-
sor 1210, a network interface 1220, memory 1230, and non-
volatile storage 1240. These components are coupled via bus 
1250. A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand 
that the network interface 1220 may support different medias, 
speeds, etc. Examples of non-volatile storage include, for 
example, a hard disk, flash RAM, flash ROM, EEPROM, etc. 
Memory 1230 contains physical layer opportunistic security 
logic 260 from FIG. 1 and/or SECC logic 880 from FIG. 8, 
which programs or enables processor 1210 to perform the 20 
functions oflogic 260 or logic 880. Omitted from FIG. 12 are 
15 as determined by the appended claims when interpreted in 
accordance with the breadth to which they are fairly and 
legally entitled. 
a number of conventional components, known to those skilled 
in the art, that are not necessary to explain the operatio of 
computer system 1200. 
Device 110 can be implemented in software, hardware, or 25 
a combination thereof. In some embodiments, the device, 
system, and/or method is implemented in software that is 
stored in a memory and that is executed by a suitable micro-
processor, network processor, or microcontroller situated in a 
computing device. In other embodiments, the device, system 30 
and/ or method is implemented in hardware, including, but not 
limited to, a programmable logic device (PLD), program-
mable gate array (PGA), field programmable gate array 
(FPGA), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a 
system on chip (SoC), and a system on packet (SoP). 35 
Device 110 can be embodied in any computer-readable 
medium for use by or in connection with an instruction execu-
tion system, apparatus, or device. Such instruction execution 
systems include any computer-based system, processor-con-
taining system, or other system that can fetch and execute the 40 
instructions from the instruction execution system. In the 
context of this disclosure, a "computer-readable medium" 
can be any means that can contain, store, communicate, 
propagate, or transport the program for use by, or in connec-
tion with, the instruction execution system. The computer 45 
readable medium can be, for example but not limited to, a 
system or propagation medium that is based on electronic, 
magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconduc-
tor technology. 
Specific examples of a computer-readable medium using 50 
electronic technology would include (but are not limited to) 
the following: an electrical connection (electronic) having 
one or more wires; a random access memory (RAM); a read-
only memory (ROM); an erasable programmable read-only 
memory (EPROM or Flash memory). A specific example 55 
using magnetic technology includes (but is not limited to) a 
portable computer diskette. Specific examples using optical 
technology include (but are not limited to) an optical fiber and 
a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM). 
Any process descriptions or blocks in flowcharts would be 60 
understood as representing modules, segments, or portions of 
code which include one or more executable instructions for 
implementing specific logical functions or steps in the pro-
cess. As would be understood by those of ordinary skill in the 
art of the software development, alternate implementations 65 
are also included within the scope of the disclosure. In these 
alternate implementations, functions may be executed out of 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method for securely communicating from a sender 
device to a receiver device on a main channel when an eaves-
dropper device is listening on an eavesdropper channel, the 
method comprising: 
encoding a message with a secure error correcting code 
(SECC) to produce an encoded message, the SECC hav-
ing a set of defined characteristics that cause a bit error 
rate (BER) on the main channel to be lower than a first 
threshold BER value and cause a BER on the eavesdrop-
per channel to be higher than a second threshold BER 
value when a distance between the eavesdropper device 
and the sender device is greater than the distance 
between receiver devices and the sender device, wherein 
the second threshold BER value is greater than the first 
threshold BER value; and 
transmitting the encoded message on the main channel, 
wherein 
the SECC has the set of defined characteristics such that 
when the eavesdropper device is more than a predeter-
mined distance Z from the sender, at least a predefined 
fraction of the message is unreliable, where the pre-
defined fraction of unreliable bits renders the eavesdrop-
per unable to reliably decode messages. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the encoding is per-
formed at the physical layer of the sender device. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the main channel com-
prises a wireless channel. 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the SECC comprises a 
low density parity check code. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the SECC comprises a 
turbo code. 
6. A system for securely communicating from a sender 
device to a receiver device on a main channel when an eaves-
dropper device is listening on an eavesdropper channel, the 
system comprising: 
an encoder for encoding a plurality of bits at a physical 
layer with a secure error correcting code (SECC) to 
produce a plurality of encoded bits, the SECC having a 
set of defined characteristics that cause a bit error rate 
(BER) on the main channel to be lower than a first 
threshold BER value and cause a BER on the eavesdrop-
per channel to be higher than a second threshold BER 
value when a distance between the eavesdropper device 
and the sender device is greater than the distance 
between receiver devices and the sender device, wherein 
the second threshold BER value is greater than the first 
threshold BER value; and 
a transmitter for transmitting the encoded plurality of bits 
on the main channel, wherein between receiver device 
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and the sender device, the SECC has the set of defined 
characteristics such that when the eavesdropper device 
is more than a predetermined distance Z from the sender 
a bit error probability on the eavesdropper channel doe~ 
not exceed a predetermined security threshold while a 
14 
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the main channel has 
an signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, and the eavesdropper channel 
has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRE" 
15. The system of claim 6, wherein the main channel has an 
signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, and the eavesdropper channel 
has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRE" bit error probability on the main channel does exceed a 
predetermined reliability threshold, the plurality of 
encoded bits including a fraction of unreliable bits 
which renderthe eavesdropper unable to reliably decode 
messages on the main channel. 
16. The short range wireless communication device of 
claim 10, wherein the main channel has an signal-to-noise 
ratio SNRM, and the eavesdropper channel has a signal-to-
10 
noise ratio SNRE. 
7. The system of claim 6, wherein the main channel com-
prises a wireless channel. 
8. The system of claim 6, wherein the SECC comprises a 
low density parity check code. 
9. The system of claim 6, wherein the SECC comprises a 15 
turbo code. 
10. A short range wireless communication device for 
securely communicating to a receiver device on a main chan-
nel when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdrop-
per channel, the system comprising: 
an encoder for encoding a message at a physical layer with 
20 
a secure error correcting code (SECC) to produce an 
encoded message, the SECC having a set of defined 
characteristics that cause a bit error rate (BER) on the 
main channel to be lower than a first threshold BER 25 
value and cause a BER on the eavesdropper channel to 
be higher than a second threshold BER value when a 
distance between the eavesdropper device and the 
sender device is greater than the distance between 
receiver devices and the sender device, wherein the sec- 30 
ond threshold BER value is greater than the first thresh-
old BER value; and 
a transmitter for transmitting the encoded message on the 
main channel, wherein 
the SECC has the set of defined characteristics such 35 
that-when the eavesdropper device is more than a 
predetermined distance Z from the sender, at least a 
predefined fraction of the message is unreliable, 
where the predefined fraction of unreliable bits ren-
ders the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode mes- 40 
sages. 
11. The short range wireless communication device of 
claim 10, wherein the main channel comprises a wireless 
channel. 
12. The short range wireless communication device of 45 
claim 10, wherein the SECC comprises a low density parity 
check code. 
13. The short range wireless communication device of 
claim 10, wherein the SECC comprises a turbo code. 
17. A method for securely receiving, a receiver device, a 
message from a sender device on a main channel when an 
eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper channel, 
the method comprising: 
receiv!ng an encoded message on the main channel; repro-
ducmg a secure error correcting code (SECC) used to 
generate the encoded message; 
decod!ng the encoded message using the SECC, the SECC 
havmg a set of defined characteristics that cause a bit 
error rate (BER) on the main channel is to be lower than 
a first threshold BER value and a BER on the eavesdrop-
per channel is to be higher than a second threshold BER 
value when a distance between the eavesdropper device 
and the sender device is greater than the distance 
between receiver devices and the sender, wherein: 
the second threshold BER value is greater than the first 
threshold BER value, and 
the SECC has the set of defined characteristics such that 
when the eavesdropper device is more than a predeter-
mined distance Z from the sender, at least a predefined 
fraction of the message is unreliable, where the pre-
defined fraction of unreliable bits renders the eavesdrop-
per unable to reliably decode messages. 
18. The method of claim 17, wherein during a first time 
period, signal quality on the main channel is better than the 
signal quality on the eavesdropper channel. 
19. The method of claim 17, wherein the decoding is per-
formed at the physical layer of the receiver device. 
20. The method of claim 17, wherein the main channel 
comprises a wireless channel. 
21. The method of claim 17, wherein the SECC comprises 
a low density parity check code. 
22. The method of claim 17, wherein the SECC comprises 
a turbo code. 
23. The method of claim 17, wherein the main channel has 
an signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, and the eavesdropper channel 
has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRE" 
* * * * * 
